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Abstract:  Jonathan Birch proposes a criterion for the subjective scope of animal protection 
legislation. He says nothing about its material scope: which harmful practices it should 
regulate. I argue, first, that most moral views would agree that the worst forms of animal 
exploitation should be legally forbidden, even if there will inevitably be disagreement about 
some cases of animal experimentation. I also argue that, when feasible, there should be legal 
provisions to help wild animals.  
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Jonathan Birch (2017) claims that when there is adequate evidence about the sentience of a 
nonhuman animal species, it should be brought under the scope of animal protection 
legislation. In that sense, Birch’s Animal Sentience Precautionary Principle (ASPP) functions as 
the criterion for determining the subjective scope of such legislation: to which individuals it 
applies. Nevertheless, as Birch (2017) himself admits (p. 8), his proposal needs to be further 
specified regarding the material scope of that legislation. It is necessary to develop a criterion 
to identify which harmful practices must be covered by its provisions. In that regard, I will 
defend two claims: (a) because only morally unjustified harmful practices should be restricted, 
there will inevitably be some disagreement about which ones fall within the law’s scope; (b) 
animals should also be protected against unjustified harmful omissions. 
 
1. Not all harmful practices. In a wide sense, all possible harmful practices towards animals 
fall under the scope of animal protection legislation. This is because even with those for whom 
there need be no specific provision, their legal status can be inferred from the general legal 
principle that everything that is not forbidden is allowed. Here, however, I am concerned with 
the material scope of animal law in a narrow sense: which harmful practices should be 
restricted, either by permitting them only under some circumstances or by completely 
prohibiting them. 
According to Birch, the purpose of animal protection legislation is to prevent “serious, 
negative animal welfare outcomes.” It must deal with practices that may, on aggregate, result 
in predictably high negative well-being for the animals concerned. If they are to be restricted, 
that is presumably because there is a risk that they are not morally justified. Thus, only 
practices that are morally unjustified should fall under the purview of these laws. 
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Nevertheless, whether a harmful practice is morally justified depends, on most views, 
on the size of the expectable positive well-being that may be derived from it. For example, on 
the basis of utilitarianism, it suffices that the result of causing serious harm to nonhuman 
animals is, on aggregate, net positive. Other moral views, both consequentialist and non-
consequentialist, will require larger benefits (sometimes, much larger) for a harmful practice 
to be justified. Inevitably, then, when determining the material scope of animal protection 
legislation, we will find reasonable disagreement about which practices fall under it, and 
whether they should be prohibited or, alternatively, permitted, provided that certain 
conditions are met. 
A case in point is animal experimentation for biomedical purposes, which Birch 
frequently uses to illustrate his principle. From a utilitarian perspective, if the expected results 
are net positive, taking into account the benefits for both humans and nonhumans, such 
experiments would be justified (e.g., de Lazari-Radek & Singer, 2014). Other views, however, 
would oppose using animals for such experiments unless the benefits are much greater. On 
some deontological accounts, even, the constraint not to harm a sentient individual may never 
be overridden, or only in order to prevent some moral catastrophe (Regan, 2004; Korsgaard, 
2005). However, it is worth noting that such disparate moral theories can agree about the 
need to establish strict legal requirements to minimise the pain and deprivation suffered by 
these animals. That would include a preference to use those individuals whose sentience is 
more uncertain. These are indeed the kinds of legislative measures Birch seems to have in 
mind (Birch, 2017, pp. 8 and 12). 
It is important, however, not to overstate the disagreement among different moral 
views. Although the justifiability of animal experimentation may be, in this sense, 
controversial, that is not the case regarding those human practices which are most harmful to 
animals. Animal exploitation in the food industry, including factory farming and aquaculture, 
is much worse, because of the larger number of animals subjected to it and the seriousness of 
the harms the animals suffer. Provided that they reject speciesism, most moral theories would 
agree that these forms of exploitation are morally unjustified, because the marginal benefit 
human beings derive from them is minimal. For similar reasons, most moral theories would 
agree that animal exploitation for other trivial purposes (clothing, entertainment, 
manufacture and testing of cosmetic or household products) is likewise unjustified. There is 
widespread agreement, then, that animal protection law should forbid practices such as those 
involving nonhuman animals who meet Birch’s ASPP standard. 
 
2. Serious harm by omission and a legal requirement of assistance. Harmful practices 
affecting nonhuman individuals do not consist solely of human-bred animal exploitation or 
experimentation. Wild animals are also harmed by human action. This is sometimes done for 
sport, but on many occasions, by human interference in the wild for conservationist purposes. 
An example of these negative interventions is killing individuals of ‘invasive’ species to 
preserve autochthonous ones or as a method of population control. An animal protection law 
which fully considered the interests of these animals would never condone harmful practices 
of environmental management except to promote the overall well-being of the nonhuman 
animals affected, and only insofar as less harmful methods were not available. 
On the other hand, human non-interference with wild animals can be, arguably, even 
more harmful for them. Life in nature is not idyllic. Because of the natural harms nonhuman 
animals undergo, most of them have lives of net suffering (Ng, 1995; Horta, 2010; Tomasik, 
2015; Faria, 2016). Presently, there is little that human beings can do about wild animal 
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suffering on a large scale. In that respect, other pieces of legislation may incentivise research 
on this issue. Yet many small- and medium-scale positive interventions on behalf of wild 
animals are currently possible. These include providing them with some medical care against 
injuries, as well as vaccination and feeding campaigns. It may eventually be possible 
technically to extend to other animals welfare-state institutions we now take for granted for 
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